2 edition of Renegotiation design under symmetric information found in the catalog.
by Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass
Written in English
Includes bibliographical references.
|Other titles||Symmetric information, Renegotiation design under.|
|Statement||Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Philippe Rey|
|Series||Working paper / Department of Economics -- no. 522, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 522.|
|Contributions||Dewartripont, M. (Mathias), Rey, Philippe, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||1 v. (various pagings) :|
Under the condition of information asymmetry, there are two strategic choices for investors in the renegotiation stage of the PPP projects. One is to conduct reasonable renegotiation under the condition of non-opportunism (“non-opportunism”), and the other is to take opportunistic behavior to obtain additional benefits (“opportunism”). Books at Amazon. The Books homepage helps you explore Earth's Biggest Bookstore without ever leaving the comfort of your couch. Here you'll find current best sellers in books, new releases in books, deals in books, Kindle eBooks, Audible audiobooks, and so much more.
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Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. Written for introductory courses seeking a little rigor. The 4th edition brings the material fully up-to-date and includes new end-of-chapter problems and classroom projects, as well Price: $ Reflection symmetry, line symmetry, mirror symmetry, mirror-image symmetry, is symmetry with respect to is, a figure which does not change upon undergoing a reflection has reflectional symmetry. In 2D there is a line/axis of symmetry, in 3D a plane of symmetry. An object or figure which is indistinguishable from its transformed image is called mirror symmetric.
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Workingpaper department ofeconomics RENEGOTIATIONDESIGNUNDER SYMMETRICINFORMATION PhilippeAghion MathiasDewatripont PhilippeRey No June massachusetts instituteof technology. Renegotiation under symmetric but verifiable information The basic framework analysed by the literature is as follows: consider a contract on future trade between a buyer and a seller.
Neither knows in advances the net value of trade. This becomes observable ex-post but remains unverifiable to a third by: On renegotiation design 3. Concluding remarks This analysis focused on contracting situations where the relevant information is shared (ex post) by all contractors, but cannot be completely part of the contract; we moreover supposed that a contract can always be renegotiated when doing so is mutually by: Renegotiation design under symmetric information By Philippe Aghion, M.
Dewartripont and Philippe Rey Publisher: Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Taking this route Schmitz (), using a mechanism design approach, demonstrates that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post.
We analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a specific example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information. Specifically, we consider a setting where managers are better informed than lenders regarding potential transfers from debt to equity associated with future investments.
Hence, the parties can renegotiate under symmetric information at the beginning of period 2. If 0=01, moreover, they can transact a Pareto improvement, since, as we have noted, is not ex post efficient. Although such renegotiation improves welfare ex post, it violates the incentive constraints (3) and thus is harmful in an ex ante sense.
Gârleanu and Zwiebel () analyse the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts under asymmetric information, that is managers have superior information about potential wealth. Downloadable (with restrictions). We analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a specific example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information.
Specifically, we consider a setting where managers are better informed than lenders regarding potential transfers from debt to equity associated with future investments.
(2) 01 Note that since renegotiation takes place under symmetric information, trade will be ex post efficient for all c) E,f2. Therefore, if a contract (q, induces the efficient investment o- *, then the actual quantity to be traded will be q *(to, Q *) for each to E fl.
Books scanned by the Internet Archive for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Libraries. Renegotiation design under symmetric information. by Aghion, Philippe; Dewartripont, M. (Mathias); Rey, Philippe; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics Symbolisme en architecture, Design MIT Libraries.
" Renegotiation Design Under Symmetric Information," Working papersMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. Ching-to Albert Ma, " Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol.
(1), pages Todd Kaplan, In book: Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk, pp the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship-specific investment and renegotiation. Downloadable (with restrictions). Under symmetric information, a job protection law that says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ them tomorrow can only reduce the two parties’ total surplus.
The law restricts the principal’s possibilities to maximize their profit, which equals the total surplus, because they leave no rent to the agent. Asymmetric information; The initial contract can cover only short-term situations.
Eventually, renegotiation is needed, which provides an opportunity for e.g. S to hold up B. As S knows that the investment is a significant cost to B and tries to use this as leverage to negotiate an increase in its prices.
In a similar setting, Garleanu and Zwiebel () analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a particular example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information. 7 They show that stronger rights are granted to the lender in the initial contract, in particular when information asymmetry.
Symmetry might also be used to develop familiarity with layout. Using symmetry in a design is a feature that might particularly benefit someone with learning disabilities, for example. However, when complexity increases, you will often find that you can manage asymmetry more easily.
The paper analyzes the issue of commitment in Grossman and Hart's model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability.
renegotiation design is necessary to. This book, edited by Jacob A. Frenkel, Michael P. Dooley, and Peter Wickham, presents a sample of the work of the IMF and that of world-renowned scholars on the analytical issues surrounding the explosion of countries with debt-servicing difficulties and describes debt initiatives and debt-reduction techniques that hold the best promise for finding a lasting solution to the problems of debtor.
Under symmetric information, a job protection law which says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ him tomorrow can only reduce the two parties’ total surplus. We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach.
We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts to a constraint on the problem. We formalize and clarify the Renegotiation-Proofness Principle (RPP.Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, "Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol.
19(3), pagesSeptember.RENEGOTIATION DESIGN WITH UNVERIFIABLE INFORMATION. This paper considers a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and/or random utility parameters.
In such situations, it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first-best outcomes.